The presence of 50,000 Americans in Iran, often acting boorishly, was a powerful irritant straight up to the Revolution. Even today, the openings occasioned by the nuclear negotiations are resisted by Supreme Leader 'Ali Khamenei precisely because of the capitulations and what is regarded as the inimical influence of the West. So Mirfendereski has done a great service by tracing this legal, diplomatic, and social instrument.
The book, quite well-written and often entertaining (as with a digression on the use of the word "dog" in Khomeini's diatribes), is workmanlike in tracing the history of the capitulations in Iran. More detail at certain junctures would have been welcome, as with the period of Reza Shah in the 1920s and 1930s. A more serious shortcoming is the seeming avoidance of context of transformative events and influences. Why the keen interest from the United States, Britain, and others in Iran in the 1920s? The discovery of oil might be at work, but it is not mentioned, and such foreign interests are too lightly regarded throughout. The overthrow of Prime Minister Mohammed Mosaddeq is described a bit awkwardly in one paragraph, yet it foreshadowed much of the drama surrounding the Status Law and the White Revolution (Mohammed Reza Shah's controversial reforms) in the early 1960s, particularly the clerics' fierce opposition to anything resembling secularization.
Mirfenderski's father, Ahmad, was a key player in much of the Iranian government's dealings with capitulations in the 1960s, and eventually became the last foreign minister of the Pahlavi regime. If and how this influenced his book is difficult to gauge; in one key passage, the author articulates commonly held criticism of his father's handling of the Status Law negotiations, though he also humanizes the difficult position his father was placed in. This episode is an interesting little sideshow to the bigger circus that was US-Iran relations in those days, but like other moments in this history, it would have benefited from a more elaborate treatment. 
Reviewed by Nazia Hussain
Laurent Gayer's work is a valuable contribution to understanding the seemingly chaotic existence of Karachi, an important "megacity" that offers unique but comparative insights for other possible case studies. Gayer builds a case for understanding the "ordered disorder" of Karachi and argues that far from being chaotic and ungovernable, the city's "order," or underlying principles of a historical figuration (p. 12), is predicated on patterns of domination, rituals of interaction, and forms of arbitration (p. 5).
The main ingredient of this order is violence that is rooted in social processes, and thus calls for understanding violence as "conflict in motion" (p. 12). Gayer's question is why Karachi has been spared "a fullblown, free-for-all conflagration" (p. 15) despite decades of violent conflict (p. 13). Instead of understanding violence through deterministic causal explanations, he encourages scholars to adopt a processual approach, i.e. one that is attentive to the contingent and self-generative nature of change (p. 12). Through four mini-studies tracing the escalation of violence on student campuses, the evolution and predominance as a de facto hegemon by the Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM) through coercive means and electoral victories, and emergence of aspiring contenders to control the city in the form of criminal gangs of Lyari and radical Islamic groups such as the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), Gayer lays out how violence has shaped discourse among the players.
Such an understanding of violence and "order" departs from the traditional understanding of social order in sociology and political science as that of the state's monopoly over violence. Instead, it is premised on Norbert Elias's sense of a "game structure," which revolves around interdependent actors and which reproduces itself over time, acquiring a social form even in times of seeming chaos (p. 12). Thus, violence will keep reproducing itself in different forms as a result of interactions and interdependencies over time. The Pakistani state, Gayer argues, plays the role of referee amid the different power players, sometimes overtly supporting one actor, and at times providing patronage to others covertly. The result is production of a complex "ordered disorder," which is exemplified by an increasing number of violent entrepreneurs and atomization of political and criminal violence.
Gayer's work adds to the repository of work on Karachi 1 and is a brilliant treatise of understanding conflict in Karachi through a well-researched and holistic account of the city's many protagonists and problems, from its violence-ridden everyday realities to the deregulated provision of basic amenities to overt and covert alliances between the state and different players. His account is strengthened by evidence he collected over eight months of field work within twelve years, interviews with activists, political party members, militants, and social workers as well as reviews of local press, Urdu poetry, and political party literature. This book's strength lies in its approach to disentangle the discourse of social order and violence from statist explanations and root them in social processes and histories. Gayer adds credence to his argument by linking Karachi's narrative to groundbreaking work on "emergent orders" and "twilight institutions," or de facto authorities in contemporary and civic groups are contributing to more "organic" forms of public order.
Gayer does not go as far as calling "order" in Karachi a parallel form of governance but does point out competing sovereignties in different parts of the city where the Pakistani state is at best a referee. He also cautions us to refrain from narrowing the debate about whether the Pakistani state has failed or collapsed or is weak, and replace it with the understanding of everyday functioning and negotiation of authority. After all, the existence of deregulated provision of basic services such as housing or water or jobs 3 is made possible through collusive partnerships and interactions between actors in official and unofficial realms. This phenomenon is not unique to Pakistan. Gayer's account generates a rich debate and raises additional questions to consider, a true mark of its success. Karachi revolves around violence and its patterns. Yet, in doing so, it runs the risk of relegating other elements to peripheries of causal (and also processual) accounts. An example is that of deregulated provision of basic amenities of housing and water by various actors, which are also contributing to formation of "order" in Karachi. Although Gayer mentions these aspects, they are tangential to the central thread of tracing violence in different time periods. Another aspect which Gayer illustrates, but which remains subsumed within the framework of struggle among different actors for control of the city is how actors other than the MQM began to mirror its reliance on coercion, capture of local and state power, and practices such as extortion. If viewed within a lens other than that of violence, one can identify it as social and political learning on the part of various actors. The MQM's actions contributed to the emergence of a blueprint that various players perceived as useful for seeking control of the city. Gayer's account of Karachi points to violence as the main causal process, but it does not highlight the importance of social and political diffusion of techniques in generating ordered disorder by other actors in enough detail. The case study of Karachi is important in the sense that it is developed enough for drawing lessons about other mega cities where historical figurations, or order, are giving way to a new equilibrium, or ordered disorder. 
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PALESTINE AND PALESTINIANS
Gaza
Reviewed by Sara Roy
When I first visited the Occupied Palestinian Territories in the summer of 1985, I began my research in the West Bank. I have never forgotten a conversation I had with a Palestinian academic I was interviewing. After telling him how much I was looking forward to working in the Gaza Strip, he told me, "There is no need to go to Gaza. Everything you need to learn about Palestinians is right here in the West Bank." I was quite shocked by his comment, but as I subsequently learned, it reflected Gaza's continued marginalization -political, economic, and historical -even among Palestinians themselves.
Gaza has long been treated as an appendage of the West Bank and Jerusalem, two areas that have long been the focus of Palestinian historiography. Although the Gaza Strip has forced its way into the world's political consciousness particularly over the last decade, it has done so by virtue of the terrible violence in which it is often engulfed, reducing Gaza and her people to a facile, singular stereotype, absent of context or past, belying the area's fascinating and monumental history and political significance.
Jean-Pierre Filiu's Gaza: A History brilliantly challenges the shallow and painful singularity through which Gaza has long been viewed. Filiu has written what will undeniably become the definitive study of Gaza's history, a truly masterful work, rich in detail and analytical depth, nuanced in its political analysis.
Stunning in scope, the book begins in the 18 th century BCE with a discussion of the Hyksos people who used the region around Gaza as a base for their conquest of Egypt -as did many subsequent invaders -and ends in the present day with the struggle over political reconciliation between Fatah and Hamas. Filiu's sweep of history is neither superficial nor inaccessible; rather, it is a substantive, dynamic history, meticulously and authoritatively told. There are so many interesting (and not widely known) facts, some more peripheral than others, but still important. For example, opponents of the Palestinian cause often point to Hajj Amin al-Husayni and his support for the Nazi war effort as an example of Palestinian antiJewishness. Yet as Filiu writes, "The fascist war machine might broadcast the exhortations of the mufti of Jerusalem . . . but they found little response in the Arab world. The Nazi armed forces recruited only 6,300 auxiliaries of Arab origin, of whom only 1,300 came from Palestine, Syria, or Iraq. By way of comparison, across the entire course of the conflict, 7,578 Arabs enlisted in the British army in Palestine alongside 10,483 Jewish volunteers" (p. 48).
Filiu focuses on the period since 1947 and compellingly argues that Gaza's history cannot be separated from that of Palestine and is, in fact, essential to it: "It is in Gaza that the foundations of a durable peace should be laid . . . The Gaza Strip, the womb of the fedayin and the cradle of the intifada, lies at the heart of the nation-building of
